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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
DENNIS ROSA-RE, : Case No. 20070305-SC 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
Under Utah law, a defendant making an objection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986), must do so before the trial court empanels the jury and excuses the 
remainder of the venire. See_ State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, | f 2, 26, 38-39, 46-47, 140 
P.3d 1219. In this case, the court of appeals recognized that counsel for Petitioner Dennis 
Rosa-Re raised a "Batson challenge" in a sidebar conference before the trial court em-
paneled a jury and excused remaining veniremembers. State v. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 
91U, * 2, 2007 WL 772769. Notwithstanding, the court of appeals ruled that Rosa-Re's 
Batson challenge was "untimely" because counsel failed to "conclude" or "resolve" the 
challenge until later. Id. 
The court of appeals' ruling is in error. Once a defendant raises a Batson 
challenge, the trial court is responsible for resolving it. Thus, the trial court delay was 
trial court error. This Court should reverse the court of appeals' ruling and remand the 
case for a merits decision on the Batson issue. (See Brief of Petitioner, October 3, 2007). 
On review here, the State has raised other issues in its brief. It claims Rosa-Re's 
Batson objection was inadequate. Yet counsel for Rosa-Re objected to the prosecutor's 
use of peremptory strikes on gender grounds, and he relied on Batson. The objection was 
clear, concise, and sufficient. 
In addition, the State has asked this Court to expand the procedural rules for a 
timely Batson objection beyond what is required in Valdez. Yet even if this Court were 
to expand the procedural rules, those rules would not apply here. This Court has 
recognized that it may "bar appellate consideration of the merits of a Batson challenge on 
timeliness grounds" only if the rules for timeliness are "firmly established and regularly 
followed." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, If 19. Since Rosa-Re complied with firmly established 
and regularly followed rules in raising his claim, it was error for the court of appeals to 
refuse to address the issue on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
WHEN A DEFENDANT MAKES A CHALLENGE UNDER BATSON V. 
KENTUCKY, BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT HAS EMPANELED A JURY 
AND EXCUSED THE REMAINING VENIREMEMBERS, THE TRIAL 
COURT MUST RESOLVE THE CHALLENGE. 
A trial court is obligated to promptly resolve an objection "if it is properly 
articulated and timely presented." (Brief of Respondent, January 4, 2008, at 23). A 
Batson challenge is timely "if raised both before the jury is sworn and before the 
remainder of the venire is excused." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f^l[2, 26, 46, 47. Also, the issue 
is timely if raised after all peremptory strikes have been exercised. Id. at If 43 n. 21. 
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A. THE OBJECTION HERE WAS TIMELY, SPECIFIC, CLEAR AND 
CONCISE; IT ALERTED THE TRIAL COURT AND PROSECUTOR TO THE 
NEED TO ENGAGE IN THE BATSON ANALYSIS. 
The State maintains that a defendant must make a clear and concise objection 
under Batson in order for it to be properly preserved in the trial court. (See, e.g., Brief of 
Respondent, 10, 14-15, 25). In this case, counsel for Rosa-Re articulated a proper 
objection for a timely ruling. Thus, the defense preserved the Batson issue for review. 
Specifically, after the parties in Rosa-Re's case exercised peremptory strikes and 
before the trial court empaneled the jury and dismissed the remaining veniremembers, 
defense counsel requested a sidebar conference and he made a Batson challenge. (See R. 
146:38, lines 13-15; 164). Defense counsel specified that the prosecutor used peremptory 
strikes to engage in a pattern of discrimination by removing three men from the venire. 
(R. 164 (stating of the remaining veniremembers, the prosecutor struck three men)). The 
challenge concerned gender discrimination. (See R. 164:38; Brief of Petitioner, 
Argument C.); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (recognizing that a 
pattern of striking men from the venire violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
Defense counsel's reference in the sidebar conference to "Batson" adequately 
alerted the trial court to the objection to preserve the claim. The reference invoked a 
specific body of law that forbids "discrimination] against potential jurors by exercising 
peremptory [strikes]" on the basis of race or gender. State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 14, 
994 P.2d 177; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140. 
A Batson challenge is not an objection to a member of the venire, and it is not an 
objection to a person serving on the jury. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (stating that 
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the part of the selection process at issue is the State's use of peremptory challenges). It is 
not an objection to the way in which the court has compiled the list of veniremembers for 
jury selection and it is not an objection to empaneled jurors. See, e.g.. State v. Bankhead, 
727 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1986) (reflecting a challenge to the jury where defendant 
claimed the venire did not represent a fair cross section of the community or include any 
member of her race). 
It is an objection to a prosecutor, who uses peremptory strikes to engage in a 
pattern of discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause to exclude individual 
veniremembers from serving on the jury due to race or gender. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. 
at 141-42 (recognizing that prospective jurors "have the right not to be excluded" from 
jury service "because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and 
reinforce patterns of historical discrimination"); see also Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 1 n.l 
(recognizing that a "Batson challenge" refers to the body of law generated by Batson v. 
Kentucky, under Batson and its progeny, a prosecutor is prohibited from using peremp-
tory strikes for racial or gender reasons); id. at f^ 25 (stating a Batson challenge is an 
"objection to an opposing litigant's improper use of peremptory challenges"). 
In this case, the record supported defense counsel's claims. After the trial court 
excluded potential jurors for cause, the top eight remaining veniremembers included five 
women and three men. (See R. 78 (veniremembers numbered 2, 5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17)). 
The prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove the top three men who presumptively 
would sit on the jury. (R. 78 (veniremembers 2, 14, 15)). The men were easily 
identifiable in the record. (R. 78 (reflecting the prosecutor struck [2] Boyd Tidwell, [14] 
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Jed Worley and [15] Darrel Jensen)). The prosecutor's pattern reflected discrimination 
based on gender. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (ruling government attorney violated 
Batson by using peremptory challenges to exclude men from the jury). 
Once defense counsel here raised the Batson objection and specified that the 
challenge concerned the prosecutor's pattern of striking men from the venire, the trial 
court pointed out that the defense struck "a Hispanic" from the panel (see R. 164:38), and 
the prosecutor claimed that his actions in striking men were not "intentional on my part." 
(R. 164:38); but see Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ]fl5 (stating it is not enough for proponent of 
the peremptory strike to deny a discriminatory motive or to profess good faith). Those 
responses reflect that the trial court and prosecutor understood the significance of the 
Batson challenge. 
Indeed, defense counsel maintained the objection. (R. 164:38). He stated in the 
sidebar conference that the parties and court would need to "go through" the Batson 
process. (See R. 164:38); see also, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) 
(reflecting the Batson three-part analysis, which requires, first, that the defendant "make 
out a prima facie case" of discrimination; second, that the State offer race- or gender-
neutral justifications for the strikes; and third, that the trial court decide whether there 
was discrimination in the selection process); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006); 
Valdez, 2006 UT 39, If 15; (Brief of Petitioner, pp. 5-8 (describing Batson process)). 
As defense counsel made that statement, the trial court interrupted and stated, 
"Okay, alright, we can do that." (R. 164:38). However, rather than "do that," the trial 
court immediately turned to empaneling the jury. (IcL\ R. 146:38). 
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As the record shows, counsel for Rosa-Re made a proper and timely objection 
under Bats on. See Vqldez, 2006 UT 39, fflf 2, 26, 46-47 (stating a ffqfao/7 challenge is 
timely if raised before the jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is 
excused); i<L at | 1 n.l (recognizing that a "Batson challenge" refers to the body of law 
generated by Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits a prosecutor from injecting racial or 
gender discrimination into the jury selection process); see also Ford v. Georgia. 498 U.S. 
411, 419-20 (1991) (ruling defendant made a timely Batson challenge where he alleged 
that the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of excluding veniremembers of a particular race). 
The objection also satisfied the first part of the Batson analysis and the prima facie 
showing. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, [^15 (stating under the first step, the party raising Batson 
"must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the 
petit jury"); see also State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); (Brief of Petitioner, 
pp. 5-8, 21). 
Under the prima facie showing, the defendant is required to raise "an inference of 
discriminatory purpose." Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 
(cite omitted)); Valdez, 2006 UT 39, U 15. That showing does not have to satisfy a 
particular burden of proof. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (stating a party raising a Batson 
challenge does not have to show that it is "more likely than not" that the peremptory 
strikes were based on discrimination). It may be satisfied "'by relying solely on the facts 
concerning'" jury selection in the case. M at 169 n. 5 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 95). A 
party's pattern of striking veniremembers of a particular gender may support the first step. 
See United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007); Ex Parte Branch, 526 
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So.2d 609, 622-623 (Ala. 1987) (stating if a party uses "4 of 6 peremptory challenges" to 
strike members of a specific race, that is evidence supporting an inference of 
discrimination); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129, 136 (holding that use of peremptory 
strikes to remove men from the venire violates equal protection) (cite omitted); State v. 
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363,^[18,58P.3d867 (recognizing equal protection prohibits 
gender discrimination: gender "is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and 
impartiality") (citing J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129), cert denied, 61 P.3d 495 (Utah 2003). 
Where the objection here was clear, concise, and alerted the trial court to the need 
to engage in the Batson analysis, the delay in resolving the Batson challenge was trial 
court error. (See Brief of Petitioner, pp. 5-8, 11-20). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RESOLVED THE OBJECTION 
PROMPTLY. SINCE IT POSTPONED RESOLUTION, THE REMEDIES 
AVAILABLE FOR A VIOLATION WERE LIMITED. 
After Rosa-Re objected to the prosecutor's improper use of peremptory challenges 
(see R. 146:38, lines 13-15; 164:38), it was up to the trial court to take action and resolve 
the issue under the Batson three-part test. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 
(1991) (recognizing that "legitimate doubts" about the jury system arise if the trial court 
"has no duty" to make "prompt inquiry" into the objection). 
The Batson three-part analysis is a tool for the trial court. See Johnson, 545 U.S. 
at 168 (stating "[t]hose three Batson steps should by now be familiar"); see also Valdez, 
2006 UT 39, If 42 (stating the Batson process "rests on the premise that the trial court will 
hear the objection") (cite omitted). It is intended to allow for immediate relief where a 
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violation has occurred, l 
The Batson process "rests on the premise that the trial court will hear the objection 
and make a factual finding of whether the [proponent] has used peremptory challenges in 
a discriminatory manner." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, If 42 (citing Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 116 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The three-part analysis "is meant to 
!encourage[ ] prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial 
disruption of the jury selection process.'" Id, at If 19 (emphasis added) (citing Johnson, 
545 U.S. at 172-73) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also id_ at Tf 44. 
To ensure that the framework of Batson "produces actual answers, it is necessary that 
Batson challenges are promptly raised and that courts timely rule upon them" Valdez, 
2006 UT 39,1f 43 (emphasis added); see also McCroiy v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 
1247-48 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating objections must be "ruled upon promptly"). 
When a Batson challenge is made, it is in the trial court's best interest to promptly 
resolve it since the court is better equipped to decide the issue while the behaviors, man-
nerisms and responses of veniremembers are fresh in mind. See, e.g., Valdez, 2006 UT 
39, f^ 43. Also, the party raising the Batson objection is better "equipped to demonstrate" 
l The State asserts that the Batson analysis is "identical to that used to resolve 
equal protection claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (Brief of 
Respondent, 11). Yet a claim under Title VII is initiated with a complaint filed in federal 
court and it involves discovery and resolution of the issues in a trial. 
The Batson process is not intended to take on the attributes of a federal case, and it 
is not intended to take as long to resolve. The Batson process allows the trial court to 
resolve a discrimination claim on the spot without time-consuming procedures. It 
"encourages prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial 
disruption of the jury selection process." Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172-73 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that it has merit. Id_ And the proponent of the peremptory strikes "is more capable of 
presenting evidence to rebut a Batson challenge" while matters are fresh in his mind. IcL 
On the other hand, trial court delay in addressing and resolving a Batson issue will 
impact on the process. It "risks infecting what would have been the prosecutor's 
spontaneous explanations with contrived rationalizations." United States v. Biaggi, 909 
F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating delay creates "a subtle pressure for even the most 
conscientious district judge to accept explanations of borderline plausibility to avoid the 
only relief then available, a new trial"), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991). 
As the Alabama Supreme Court stated, 
The trial judge should not, as he did in this case, wait until the end of the trial to 
make a ruling on the motion for a mistrial based on the state's impermissible use of 
its peremptory challenges. The trial judge should rule on any motion that attacks 
the state's use of its peremptory strikes before the jury is sworn to try the case, 
unless, of course, the parties agree to allow the state to present race-neutral 
reasons at a later time. We do not suggest that the additional time, as was given in 
this case, necessarily allowed the prosecutors in this case to present race-neutral 
reasons they did not have at the time the motion was made, but the allowance of 
additional time would present this opportunity, if a prosecutor were so inclined. 
Ex Parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 625. 
Also, trial court delay wastes resources. See, e.g., United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 
99, 103 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating when a new trial must be granted because of an untimely 
Batson decision, error adds "unnecessary expenditure of judicial and litigant resources 
since a new trial could have been avoided by a timely decision"), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
816 (1991); Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 679 (ruling district court's preference for written motions 
"must give way to the need to resolve a Batson claim at the point where prompt correc-
tive action can be taken if the claim is successful"); State v. Williams, 524 So.2d 746, 747 
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(La. 1988) (finding error where the trial court deferred ruling on a Batson challenge until 
later); Ex Parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 625; Valdez, 2006 UT 39, If 44 (stating if SL Batson 
violation is found after the jury has been sworn and the venire has been dismissed, the 
only remedy is mistrial and such remedy is "an inefficient use of judicial time and 
resources" and a burden on parties); see also Parham v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 490 
S.E.2d 696, 703 (W.Va. 1997) (stating immediate resolution promotes "judicial economy 
by addressing meritorious claims without the necessity of awarding a new trial"). 
In fact, Batson gives trial judges broad discretion in fashioning a remedy when 
discrimination taints the selection process. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24 
(recognizing possible remedies for Batson violation, and refusing to favor one remedy 
over the other); see also United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 
2007) (declining the "invitation to craft any kind of bright-line rule to circumscribe the 
district court's discretion," in fashioning a remedy); Koo v. McBride, 124 F.3d 869, 873 
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating the Supreme Court "made it clear that the fashioning of a remedy 
is a matter upon which state courts are to be accorded significant latitude"). 
The trial court can remedy a violation by "reinstating the stricken juror." Valdez, 
2006 UT 39, Tf 44; see also id_ at \ 40 (stating if a violation is to be remedied "by seating 
the wrongfully struck juror," it must be raised and the trial court must rule on it "before 
the venire is dismissed"). Also, it can correct a violation with alternative remedies, which 
may include calling additional jurors, or calling "an entirely new venire from which to 
select a new jury," or declaring a mistrial. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, \ 44; McCroiy, 82 F.3d 
at 1247 (stating a Batson objection "is remediable in any one of a number of ways. 
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Challenges found to be abusive may be disallowed; if this is not feasible because the 
challenged jurors have already been released, additional jurors might be called to the 
venire and additional challenges granted to the defendant; or in cases where those 
remedies are insufficient, the jury selection might begin anew with a fresh panel"). 
This Court has indicated a preference for the reinstatement remedy. See_ Valdez, 
2006 UT 39, Tf 44. Yet that is available to a trial court only if it entertains and adjudicates 
a Batson issue as soon as it is raised in the jury selection process. If the trial court waits 
to resolve the issue after it has excused unseated veniremembers, its remedies are limited 
to those that require additional resources. See, e.g., McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247. 
In this case, the State suggests that reinstating a "wrongly stricken juror" more 
adequately protects that person from discrimination. (See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, 12-
14). While that may be a reason to require a trial court to resolve a defendant's Batson 
objection immediately, Par ham, 490 S.E.2d at 703, it should be noted that a trial court 
may not be required to reseat veniremembers who were wrongly stricken, since those 
veniremembers may be poisoned against the process due to the discrimination. 
In State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1993), cert, denied, 512 U.S. 1254 
(1994), the defendant made a successful Batson challenge and asked the trial court to 
reseat wrongly stricken veniremen. The court refused, and defendant raised the issue on 
appeal. I(L at 158-59. The supreme court affirmed the trial court; it considered it 
appropriate that the trial court began jury selection with a fresh panel. The court stated, 
To ask jurors who have been improperly excluded from a jury because of their 
race to then return to the jury to remain unaffected by that recent discrimination, 
and to render an impartial verdict without prejudice toward either the State or the 
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defendant, would be to ask them to discharge a duty which would require near 
superhuman effort and which would be extremely difficult for a person possessed 
of any sensitivity whatsoever to carry out successfully. As Batson violations will 
always occur at an early stage in the trial before any evidence has been introduced, 
the simpler, and we think clearly fairer, approach is to begin the jury selection 
anew with a new panel of prospective jurors who cannot have been affected by 
any prior Batson violation. 
Id. at 158-59. Thus, while reinstatement may be a preferred remedy, there may be 
occasions when it is improper or insufficient. IcL; (Brief of Respondent, 12 (recognizing 
that "[occasionally" reinstatement may be an insufficient remedy)). 
Moreover, for the wrongly excluded veniremembers, any of the above remedies 
would be appropriate. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24 (recognizing possible remedies of 
reinstating stricken veniremen or discharging the entire venire for a new jury, and 
refusing to favor one over the other). Batson does not guarantee a person the right to 
serve on the jury. See_ Powers, 499 U.S. at 409. Rather, it protects against discrimination 
in the selection process. See, e.g., id/, Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f^ 17 (stating "individual jurors 
themselves have a right to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures") (citing J.E.B., 
511 U.S. at 140-41). Thus, an improperly-excluded veniremember may be entitled only 
to a form of relief that stops the discrimination. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^[ 17 n. 12, 45 
(recognizing that wrongly stricken veniremembers may be entitled to declaratory or 
injunctive relief, but challenges by such members are rare and are not easily obtained); 
see also Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15; Black's Law Dictionary, 800 (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining injunction and injunctive relief as an order preventing an action). 
In that regard, sanctions in the form of calling "an entirely new venire from which 
to select a new jury," or declaring a mistrial, Valdez, 2006 UT 39, % 44, may be an 
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adequate remedy for all parties involved. A sanction in the form of a new jury or a 
mistrial would serve to ensure that the government did not benefit from its discriminatory 
practices, it would expose the prosecutor in his discriminatory practices, and it would 
restore confidence in the judicial process. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (stating that an 
injury suffered by the rejected juror is a loss of "confidence in the court and its verdicts"). 
Indeed, a defendant has standing to assert a claim of discrimination in his criminal 
case on behalf of the wrongly stricken veniremember since both have an interest in 
eliminating discrimination in the selection process. See, e.g., Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 17 
and n.12 (recognizing the interests at stake for the defendant, the veniremember, and the 
community concern fairness in the jury selection process, and defendants have "third-
party standing to assert the rights of wrongfully struck jurors on their behalf1); Powers, 
499 U.S. at 413-14 (recognizing that "the relationship between" the defendant and 
wronged veniremember allows defendant to assert a Batson claim for the venireman; also 
the wrongly excluded "juror and the criminal defendant have a common interest in 
eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom"). Thus, any remedy there for the 
wrongly stricken venireman may be found only in the defendant's criminal case.2 
2 While the Powers Court recognized that a defendant may stand in the shoes of a 
wronged venireperson to assert a Batson claim, the Court did not mandate a particular 
remedy for the wronged venireperson. In Powers, the defendant objected when the 
prosecutor struck seven members from the petit jury for racial reasons. Powers, 499 U.S. 
at 402-03. The Court recognized that defendant had standing to raise a claim of 
discrimination in his criminal case on behalf of the seven venirepersons. It stated, "there 
can be no doubt that petitioner will be a motivated, effective advocate for the excluded 
venirepersons' rights. Petitioner has much at stake in proving that his jury was improperly 
constituted due to an equal protection violation, for we have recognized that discrimi-
nation in the jury selection process may lead to the reversal of a conviction." IcL at 414. 
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Here the defense made a Batson challenge after the parties exercised peremptory 
challenges and before the court empaneled the jury. (R. 146:38, lines 13-15; 164:38). 
The objection was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a 
ruling and to fashion a remedy. (Id.)\ see also Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ 2, 26, 38-39, 46-
47. However, the court waited to resolve the challenge until later. The trial court's delay 
did not constitute waiver of the issue on Rosa-Re's part. It constituted trial court error. 
C. THE STATE HAS ASKED THIS COURT TO EXPAND THE 
PROCEDURAL RULES FOR TIMELINESS TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT 
TO DO MORE THAN RAISE A BATSON CHALLENGE BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT EMPANELS A JURY AND EXCUSES THE REMAINING VENIRE-
MEMBERS. THAT IS UNNECESSARY; HERE, ROSA-RE DID ENOUGH. 
While the United States Supreme Court has deferred to state courts in devising 
rules for timely Batson objections, it has recognized that an objection made "in the period 
between the selection of jurors and the administration of their oaths, is a sensible rule." 
Ford, 498 U.S. at 422. Also, it specified that a state court may prevent review of a 
Batson claim on preservation grounds only if it has "a 'firmly established and regularly 
followed state practice.m IcL at 423-24 (cite omitted). That is, the procedural rules for 
timeliness "must be firmly established and regularly followed in order to bar appellate 
consideration of the merits of a Batson challenge on timeliness grounds." Valdez, 2006 
UT 39,1f 19. 
In this case, the State asserts that after Rosa-Re made the Batson objection, he was 
required then to make an objection to the empaneled jury and an objection relating to the 
excluded veniremembers. {See Brief of Respondent, 15, 18, 19-20, 25-26). The State has 
cited to no authority that would require the additional objections for preservation 
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purposes. (See id.) Instead, it relies on the general notion that discrimination injury 
selection affects the process. (See, e.g., id. at 18 (acknowledging that Valdez does not 
require the components for preservation requested by the State)). That is not enough to 
show that additional procedures argued by the State are "firmly established and regularly 
followed," so as to bar appellate review here. See_ Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f^ 19. The State's 
argument for additional procedures in raising a Batson challenge is not supported. See. id^ 
at Tflf 2, 26, 38-39 (stating an objection is timely under Batson if it is made before the jury 
is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is excused). 
To preserve a Batson challenge, a defendant is not required to object to a trial 
court's actions in excusing wrongly stricken veniremembers, since the trial court may not 
be required to reinstate those veniremembers as a remedy. See McCollum, 433 S.E.2d at 
158-59 (recognizing that the trial court is not required to reseat veniremembers who were 
wrongfully stricken, and the "better practice" would be to begin jury selection with a new 
panel which has not been affected by the violation; also stating that it would be 
"extremely difficult" for a person who was improperly excluded from the jury for reasons 
of discrimination "to render an impartial verdict without prejudice toward either the State 
or the defendant"). 
Under the law, the remedy for a Batson violation is left to the discretion of the trial 
court. See_ Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24 (leaving remedy to the discretion of the trial 
court, and recognizing possible remedies for Batson violation but refusing to favor one 
remedy over the other). Also, courts have rejected bright-line rules regarding remedies. 
See Walker, 490 F.3d at 1295 (declining the "invitation to craft any kind of bright-line 
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rule to circumscribe the district court's discretion," in fashioning a remedy). In this case, 
Rosa-Re was not required to dictate a particular remedy to the trial court in order to 
preserve his objection under Batson. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^f 2, 26, 38-39. 
Having said that, in order for the remedy of reinstatement to be available to the 
trial court in resolving the Batson challenge, it is necessary for the trial court to address 
and rule on the objection promptly, as soon as the defense has raised the Batson issue. 
(See R. 146:38, lines 13-15; 164:38 (reflecting Batson objection)); see also Biaggi, 909 
F.2d at 679 (stating district court should address Batson claim "at the point where prompt 
corrective action can be taken if the claim is successful"); Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^ 44 
(recognizing limited remedies if the Batson challenge is resolved after the venire has 
been dismissed). 
Where the trial court delayed in resolving the matter, the trial court restricted itself 
in available remedies. That is not Rosa-Re's fault. That is trial court error. (See also 
Brief of Petitioner, pp. 11-13). Rosa-Re should not be penalized for trial court error. 
With respect to the State's claim that Rosa-Re should have challenged the em-
paneled jury for his Batson objection (see, e.g., Brief of Respondent, 15, 18, 19-20, 25-
26), that claim is defective for several reasons. Specifically, this Court has ruled that if a 
defendant making a Batson challenge raises it with regard to a jury already empaneled, 
the objection is too late. See_ Valdez, 2006 UT 39, fflj 26, 35, 46 (stating a defendant 
making an objection under Batson must do so before the jury is sworn and before the 
remainder of the venire is excused). 
In addition, the State's claim concerning an objection to the empaneled jury 
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appears to invoke Rule 18(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule governs 
objections to the jury panel (see Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(1)) or to sworn and empaneled 
jurors. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2) (2007) (stating challenges to jurors may be made "for 
good cause" after jurors are sworn if evidence has not been presented). Yet this Court 
has already held that Rule 18 "is inapplicable on its face to Batson challenges." Valdez, 
2006 UT 39,1f 24. Thus, the State's argument here is irrelevant. 
Finally, whether the challenge is to the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes 
under Batson or to an empaneled juror or jury under Rule 18, the law is clear: it is the 
responsibility of the trial court to address, resolve and conclude the challenge. {See 
supra, Argument B., herein). Specifically, Rule 18 states the following: 
(c)(1)(h) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and 
shall be in writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth the facts 
constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing 
may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The 
jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing 
thereon. 
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is 
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is 
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors to 
proceed. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (2007); see also id. 18(c)(2). 
In this case, the defense made a Batson challenge before the trial court empaneled 
the jury and excused the remainder of the venire. (R. 146:38, lines 13-15; 164:38). The 
prosecutor opposed the challenge: he maintained that his actions in striking men from the 
venire were not intentional. {Id.) At that point in the proceedings, the trial court was 
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required to resolve the matter. See, e.g., Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 19 (stating Batson test 
encourages prompt rulings); Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(l)(iii), (iv) (requiring a hearing and a 
decision by the trial court when challenges are made to the jury panel). The trial court 
delayed. Rosa-Re should not be penalized for that delay. 
Indeed, Rosa-Re did his part. By specifying his objection before the trial court 
empaneled the jury and excused the remainder of the venire, defense counsel timely 
raised the issue for appeal. See^ Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ]f 2. 
Rosa-Re did not seek to reserve an objection for later; he did not sandbag the court 
or prosecution; he did not manipulate the trial at an inopportune point at the conclusion of 
the case. He did not delay in making his objection. 
Defense counsel raised the issue sooner rather than later, while the matter was 
fresh in the prosecutor's mind. Vqldez, 2006 UT 39, f^ 43. 
He raised it at a time when the trial court could perform its function effectively 
and fashion an appropriate remedy. LL at \ 44; (see R. 146:38, lines 13-15; 164:38). The 
trial court was in control of the courtroom and proceedings. See Utah Code Jud. 
Conduct, Canon 3.B.(3) & (8) (2007) (requiring a judge to dispose of "all judicial matters 
promptly, efficiently, and fairly"). It had the tools at its disposal, and the power and 
authority to resolve the Batson objection when it was raised. See^ Valdez, 2006 UT 39, Tffl 
19, 43 (recognizing that the Batson test is meant to encourage "prompt rulings"; it 
produces actual answers where courts timely rule on objections); zd^  at [^ 42 (recognizing 
the Batson process "rests on the premise that the trial court will hear the objection and 
make a factual finding of whether the [proponent] has used peremptory challenges in a 
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discriminatory manner") (cite omitted). The trial court delayed in resolving the matter. 
(See R. 164:38 (postponing resolution)). 
The court of appeals improperly placed the burden of resolving and concluding the 
Batson challenge on the defense. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91U5 * 2 (stating Rosa-Re 
failed to resolve and conclude Batson issue). The court of appeals' ruling on timeliness 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Dennis Rosa-Re respectfully requests that this Court reverse the court of 
appeals' ruling on the timeliness issue, and remand the case to the court of appeals for a 
decision on the merits of the Batson issue. 
SUBMITTED this ( ^ day of February, 2008. 
A. Jones J Linda M. 
Michael Misner 
Heather Chesnut 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner 
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